The battle of Carrhae 53 BCE marks the first formal point of a military conflict between the Romans and an Iranian dynasty projecting the Persian empire at a larger scale; Not surprisingly after the downfall of the Iranian-originated Pontic dynasty in Asia Minor. It was the result of aggressive Roman policies during the campaigns of Pompey and Lucullus, leading to the formation of a political entity otherwise referred to as the "Roman East", which saw a turbulent period in the area encompassing eastern Asia Minor, during which the Pontic hegemony fell, paving way for Roman policies in the area, and finally an invasion of the Artaxiad dynast Tigranes' possessions in Syria, Cilicia and finally the heart of Armenia itself, culminating in the battle of Tigranocerta. This of course carried important implication to the Arsacid dynasty to the east, as they silently witnessed the display of Roman dispatching of Parthian governors in Zabdicene, Adiabene, Osrhoëne and Corduene; Jurisdictions that were otherwise formally declared by Sulla as the borderlands along the Euphrates, the effective border between the Parthians and the Romans. The Parthian inactivity and reluctance to act was translated by some as a symbol of weakness.
It was Marcus Licinius Crassus, triumvir and if legend serves its purpose, the wealthiest man in Rome, who voiced his ambition. Though he was not renowned for his military prowess, the ambition was not unfounded, for his two colleagues in the Triumvirate, Julius Caesar and Pompey had made for themselves an impressive military record. Crassus, otherwise known for his lauded participation in leading part of Sulla's army at the battle of the Colline Gate and for effectively putting an end to a dangerous gladiatorial revolt in Italy, had no equivalent popular military merit, and thus sought to make a name for himself. In spite of protests and lamentations from members of the Senate, the blessing given by his two colleagues, Julius Caesar and Pompey, carried the heavier verdic. In 55 BCE he became the governor of Syria, which brought him much closer to his desired ambition. From here, he assembled an army of over thirty thousand heavy infantry, organized in legions, four thousand light infantry auxiliaries, a majority of these probably being Syrian archer levies, and depending on how the sources are interpreted additionally a relatively high number of cavalry auxiliaries; A common figure is often four thousand irregular cavalry auxiliaries, counting Crassus' Asiatic light cavalry auxiliaries and a thousand veteran Gallic cavalry auxiliaries lent by Julius Caesar. Crassus was furthermore promised aid by his Armenian ally, King Artavasdes II, who promised additional cavalry and infantry, given certain conditions; To choose a route through the hills of Armenia and through the protection of the terrain alleviate the threat posed by the Parthian cavalry.
Crassus declined the offer given by the Armenian king; He was already under the influence of an Arab chieftain named Ariaramnes, who offered personal guidance through the Assyrian desert and offered his retinue of horsemen to the Romans. Artavasdes left the Roman entourage, taking the Armenian heavy horsemen with himself. Crassus' army seemed to have the tactical flexibility, the numbers and an optimal route for storming the rich Seleucia-Ctesiphon jurisdiction. Parthian reluctance to fight on foot, and the relatively small armies of horsemen only facilitated Roman confidence. Crassus' son, Publius Licinius Crassus, was himself a veteran from Caesar's Gallic Wars, and was honoured to lead a contingent, consisting of the Gallic cavalry, and four thousand heavy infantry. Gaius Cassius Longinus, otherwise known as one of the key characters in the conspiracy against Julius Caesar in later times, also participated in the battle, as one of Crassus' most loyal officers.
To the East, stability seemed to have returned to the Parthian empire after the quashing of a rebellion lead by Mithradates III, under the reign of High King Orodes II. He owed much of his success to an obscure but able leader of Sûrên-Pahlav clan, Rustaham, otherwise called “Surena” in the main source of information of this battle, “The Life of Crassus”, as narrated by Plutarch of Chaeronaea, a clear designation of his clan, rather than his proper name. Surena was distinguished as an extraordinary man with a highly successful career, famous for his magnificence, wisdom, loyalty and bravery. Plutarch remarks on the young age of the highly influential prince of the fiefdom in Eastern Iran, and reminds the reader about feats of bravery, such as the storming of the walls of Seleucia and personally leading his troops in an upscale battle, a very remarkable feature for an equestrian-originated warrior culture, clearly defying the long-established conception of Parthian ineptness in siege-craft. The city fell in 54 BCE, and Surena had established himself as the military arbiter who reinstated the Arsacid crown to Orodes.
Orodes’ shrewdness in politics finds its masterpiece in the prelude of the Roman campaign, as news from the Senate soon reached the court at Seleucia-Ctesiphon. The Romans did not conduct the preparations for campaign in secrecy, and Armenian-Parthian relations had seen brighter days. The humiliation wrought by Pompey, and even earlier, during a council with the Romans, Sulla had not shown respect to Parthian sensibilities. War was felt in the air. Orodes assembles the Council of Clans, as was customary of the Parthians. The plan he had in mind was elaborate, precise but swift; Scorched earth strategy, and deception would disrupt Roman logistics and supplies, while closely looming over Armenia’s soft shoulder awaiting the Armenian king to make his departure known amongst his kin; A strategic two-pronged attack, where Iranian infantry would attack Armenian possessions, while the cavalry would be dispatched to deal with the Roman threat marching eastwards through the Assyrian desert. Such a strategy required a precise knowledge of Roman intentions and their routes.
Ariaramnes had in reality bargained with the Parthians, and by this time he had persuaded Crassus that the route of his choice was not only more accessible and more direct, but constant remindings of riches beyond measure had mesmerized the senses of Rome’s wealthiest man. The Armenians at numerous occasions attempted to persuade Crassus to change route or retreat, sending scouts who warned the Romans of the danger. Soon enough Crassus’ own entourage began to grow suspicious of the wrong-headed advice given by the Arab chieftain as the Romans marched through a seemingly endless desert once the Romans had marched past the Greek city of Zeugma, and the river Zab. As Crassus soon realized his first doubts, his legions had grown exhausted, thirsty, and hungry. As the main army of Surena approached closer to the Roman lines, a clever trick on behalf of the Parthian commander kept the Romans from the initial thought of setting camp; The Romans were harassed by Parthian scouts, who finally managed to draw a significant portion of the cavalry auxiliaries from the main column, leading to a complete massacre with few survivors. The Parthian army, consisting of a total of ten thousand horsemen, seemed meagre, compact and almost underwhelmingly weak, surrounded by eerie silence. The Parthian tactical deception suggested that there was more than what first met the eye; The colourful silken banners had been lowered, and the elite de elite cataphracts had covered themselves and their horses in primitive-looking hides and skins to conceal their presence. The exhausted Roman legions found confidence and some bravery from the illusion.
As the Parthian kettledrums however bellowed and echoed throughout the desert, the Parthians followed with terrible chants; The cataphracts unveiled their bright, polished armour, “blazing like fire in the sun”, and horses covered in “plates of armour” were seen, bringing fear to the Romans, banners were raised. Surena himself had prepared for this battle, wearing kohl to protect his eyes, and parting his hair in the “Medean fashion”, thus he was easily noticed in the battle, as was the tradition of Iranian generals, to function as a rallying point. The Romans immediately commenced their hollow square formation. And so, one of the most renowned battles in Roman history beckons. How would it end?

Historically, the battle resulted in the worst defeat of a Roman army since Cannae, and it marked the beginning of the end of the Roman Republic, certainly the end of the Triumvirate, and it marked the Second Golden Age of the Parthian Empire, since the days of Mithradates II The Great, indirectly leading to Julius Caesars’ future ambition of conquest of Parthia, and directly leading to a highly successful joint Parthia-Rebel Roman campaign, between Pacorus, co-regent and son of Orodes II, Pharnapates and Quintus Labienus. The Parthian empire saw itself expanding within a few years as far as the entire Levant, and Asia Minor in a brief restoration of the previous Achaemenid borders, discounting Egypt; It had been in the ambition of the early Parthian conqueror Phraates II to have Syria conquered, during the days when the Seleucid hegemony had been beaten back to their seat in Antioch.
Strategically and tactically, the battle was a showcase of the combined synergy effect of an applied scorched-earth strategy, and Parthian refusal of giving the Romans any quarter; Means of deception were used, such as initially displaying an underwhelmingly weak and disorganized army more parallel to “savage nomads”, which would result in making a fatigued Roman army display brittle bravado. The psychological effects of initially concealing musical instruments and the silken banners paid off in the length, especially after successfully fending off Crassus’ attempt of screening the horse-archers and the slaying of Crassus’ son. The exhaustion in the Roman column facilitated the meltdown of Roman discipline. The Parthians made use of a feigned retreat strategy, where the fear of the cataphract charge forced the Romans to prepare themselves for melee, while the archery, sometimes supported by the cataphracts themselves forced the Romans to prepare their shields, putting them at disadvantage in melee, encouraging the cataphracts to restart the tactical cycle. Surena had one thousand baggage camels carrying spare arrows, which gave his army all the time it needed, to the contrary of the exhausted Romans who began to despair once the news of Parthian replenishment reached their ears.
The composite bows used by the Parthian horse-archers were able to pierce through the Roman chain-maille, and after a series of hails, eventually broke through the shield structure of the Roman scuta shields; Many legionnaires suffered their casualties through sustaining wounds on their hands and feet, either pinning them to their shields or to the ground. That the Parthian horse-archers were skilled in the tactic known as the “Parthian Shot”, a display of the agility amongst the light horse, allowing them to shoot to their sides and rear, making any withdrawal a matter of warfare as well.
In raw figures, nearly twenty thousand Romans and Roman allies were killed in action, over ten thousand captured to serve as bondsmen in the north-eastern frontier in Margiana, and ten thousand Romans who successfully withdrawed from the battle if the highest of estimates are interpreted as correct. Many Roman eagle standards (Aquilae) were captured, including that of Legio X. The prisoners were later released in a treaty concluded between Phraates IV and Augustus, effectively conflicting with a Chinese account of general Ban Chao’s encounter of “Romans”, after the conclusion of an alliance between himself and Pacorus II. The Parthians suffered minimal casualties.
Nonetheless, the triumph was brief, for under the clever leadership of Ventidius Bassus, all three of the top generals under the Parthian banner were slain, and in two enigmatic, but oft-forgotten battles, in the Taurus Mountains, and at Cyrrhestica, the Romans regained their lost territory and consolidated their Syrian possessions. Pacorus, Prince of Princes, ordained “Conquerour of the Romans” by his father, had been killed. Orodes soon fell to insanity and disease (Dropsy) and afterwards to the death by his own son, Phraates IV, first by attempted poisoning, then by strangulation; A tradition adopted from his father, and repeated to his all his thirty brethren. A fratricide marked the beginning of a statesman who hallmarked himself as cruel and ruthless, but highly capable. However his accession to the throne marked the beginning of a lethal decline of the Arsacid dynasty.
Marcus Licinius Crassus and his son, Publius Crassus, had been killed in action; The former killed in a massive infighting during an assembly offered by Surena, and the latter killed during the battle itself, by formal suicide at the eve of defeat. Publius had a posthumous role in the battle, where his decapitated head was displayed on top of a lance, as a Parthian cataphract enquired (In a haughty manner) the origins of the brave Roman officer, of which blood and house he was descended, all meant to disparage the allegedly cowardly behaviour of Crassus. Crassus himself was killed during a fight which had erupted during a meeting with the Parthians; It resulted in a complete massacre. Crassus’ head and hands were returned to Orodes during a theatre session of “Bacchae” by Euripides, ironically in a banquet celebrating the (Forced) alliance between Parthia and Armenia and the marriage between king Artavasdes’ daughter and Pacorus. Gaius Cassius Longinus, the third in command of the Roman army had successfully escaped from the scene, and managed to lead ten thousand of the surviving troops to safety. Ammianus Marcellinus draws an interesting parallel between the death of Crassus and the capture of emperor Valerian by King of Kings Shâpûr I after the battle of Edessa, revealing the legacy of the battle in Roman sensibilities.
Surena himself had been relieved of his duty permanently; Plutarch claims an eruption of jealousy, and immediately draws the lesson of Orodes’ hubris becoming a subject of defeat through the reference of his son’s death. Some authorities believe that it had always been in the ambition of Orodes, as an able statesman to rid himself of all his potential enemies, and Surena, the head of the most influential clan had connections extending to the Indo-Scythians and the Tocharians, and may have been part of a larger scheme in the Arsacid ambition of diminishing the influence of the high nobility. To the contrary of the presumed intention, Orodes did not only lose one of his most able generals, but earned the animosity of the Sûrên-Pahlavân clan, perhaps to the degree that it would affect the future relegation of the Arsacid clan as the royalty, during the Sassanian revolt, a few centuries later. The legacy of Surena, according to some has been suggested to have provided the basis for the mythical protagonist hero Rostâm of the Iranian national epic, the Shâhnâmêh.
The militarily successful tradition hallmarked by the clan did not cease by the death of Surena; Gondophares (Possibly a cognate to the Old Persian Vindafarna; “May he find glory”), the conqueror of India, and founder of the Indo-Parthian kingdom, may have been of Sûrên-Pahlavân stock, and has been speculated to have been directly descended from Surena himself. The Gondopharid beginnings not only supplaunted the previous Yuezhi hegemony under Kujula Kadphises, but found himself in control of an area spanning from Sakastana and Arachosia and the entire Indus area to the mountains of Gandhara and Minnagara as far as the Mathura strip.
More interestingly, the battle brought the first Roman contact to battle-banners of silk. During the very height of the day when the sun was shining at its brightest, the banners had been rolled out and their magnificence brought another hit to Roman morale. Ironically it lead to Roman infatuation with the material, and future controversy, as far as suggestions of banning, and for the Parthians a lucrative middleman position between the future Sino-Roman trade.
The Roman ambition for retribution, aside from Julius Caesar's expressed wish for conquest, the battle paved way for an audacious campaign by Mark Antony (Marcus Antonius), right after the Parthian retreat from Asia Minor and the Levant, in an attempt of conquering the Parthians through the Armenian hills, and through the Atropatene corridor; The result of the campaign would be decided at the very siege of Ganzacas (Or specifically the fortress of Phâspâ). The campaign resulted in utter disaster and especially the retreat would prove difficult.
It would not be until the successfully concluded negotiations under the enigmatic emperor Augustus that the contemporary popular effect resulting from the battle as a great defeat of Roman valour and pride would formally end; In spite of this, the legacy of the battle persevered.

..::PLAYING THE BATTLE::..
As the Pahlavân, your primary objective in this edition of the battle, is to decimate the diversion lead by Crassus’ son, Publius; The contingent consists of mixed Roman officers and Gallic cavalry and some heavy infantry, with a light infantry screen marching ahead of them. By itself a trivial task, and if the task has been accomplished with desirable success, it will significantly weaken the morale of the main Roman column. In this edition, you will win the battle if you kill Publius Crassus.
As the Romani, you will lead Publius' contingent of mixed cavalry, light infantry and Roman cohorts. Depending on how you start, you may choose the desperate strategy of trying to engage Surena’s bodyguard, or choose a tactical withdrawal. The horse-archers can be countered if you harness a strategy luring them close enough to the main column where the light infantry may be able to respond to the hails. The cataphracts will not cower from battle, but they lack the figures to stand up to the entire Roman column, and will especially rot after some time in protracted melee and after a few hails of pila. In this edition, you will win if you rout all the Parthian troops.